Other activities outside
the workshop
|
|
Meeting with the Nicaraguan Minister of Labour Wilfredo
Navarro
Following the workshop a group of participants met
with the Nicaraguan Minister of Labour. The Minister was informed
about the workshop and given information about ETI. He commented
that since he had been in post he had taken seriously issues concerning
the export processing industry. Last year he signed MEC's Ethical
Code that was drawn up by women workers in the export processing
zone in Managua. The Minister has shown his intent to ensure it
is respected. He also said he had been promoting the code in meetings
with other Central American Labour Ministers.
Visit to the Free Trade Zone "Las Mercedes"
A group of participants visited "Las Mercedes"
Free Trade Zone and in particular a shoe factory within the zone.
They also visited the nursery which accommodates a small percentage
of workers' children and the Labour Ministry's office inside the
zone which deals with report of non compliance with labour legislation.
Meeting with Nicaraguan NGOs and Trade Unions
A meeting was organised with representatives of
Nicaraguan NGOs and trade unions who had not attended the workshop.
A report on the workshop was given and a presentation about ETI.
Those present showed a lot of interest in knowing
more about ETI and the possibilities of workers participating
in this initiative. Finally, it was decided that there should
be more co-ordination in the future between trade unions and NGOs
with the objective of putting forward proposals and discussing
strategies on how to improve the monitoring and verification that
is already taking place in the region.
Woman worker in a
shoe factory in the Nicaraguan
free trade zone "Las Mercedes"
visited by workshop participants.
Appendices
Appendix I The Central America Women's Network
Appendix II Women Working Worldwide
Appendix III The Ethical Trading Initiative
Appendix IV Strategic problems with certification in the light
of the 25
"Social Responsibility" 8000 (SA 8000)
standard . Ronald Kopke,
Professor of Sociology at Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences,
Germany -
Co-ordinator of research into codes of conduct and monitoring
in Central America.
Appendix V The Salvadoran experience of independent
monitoring 27
Carolina Quinteros, Former member of the Independent Monitoring
Group of
El Salvador and currently a masters student at the University
of Costa Rica.
Appendix VI What Should and Shouldn't Be in Codes
of Conduct? 30
Lynda Yanz, Coordinator of Maquila Solidarity Network
Appendix I
The Central America Women's Network , Jane Turner
CAWN is a small organisation that was founded in
1991 by a group of women working in different Central America
solidarity organisations. Its principle aim is to promote an exchange
of experience between Central American and British women and promote
the development of solidarity links.
In 1995 CAWN initiated the Maquila (term used to
describe the export processing industry in Central America) project
which focused on building links with groups of women in Central
America who are working in the area of labour rights in the maquila
; raising awareness in the UK of the working conditions in the
export processing zones of Central America; promoting the development
of links between women's organisation and trade unions in the
UK and in Central America and campaigning to defend women's labour
rights in the free trade zones.
CAWN is a member of the Labour Behind the Label
Network, which is the British branch of the European Clean Clothes
Campaign campaigning for improved conditions in the garment industry.
Both CAWN and WWW are NGOs, which form part of the ETI. Its principal
aim is to improve working conditions in the South, through the
application of codes of conduct along the supply chain of British
companies, along with good practice in the monitoring and verification
of such codes of conduct.
A weakness in the ETI so far has been the lack of
consultation with the South and the lack of participation by Southern
men and women in the negotiation processes which are taking place
in the North. As far as we are concerned it is absolutely imperative
that women workers are involved in the monitoring process as without
their views the process becomes relatively meaningless.
CAWN agreed to co-ordinate the consultations and
training of women workers in Central America as we believe it
is extremely important that they have the opportunity to express
their points of view to the ETI. CAWN serves as a channel to make
these views known in the North. CAWN considers that despite their
limitations company codes of conduct could be a useful negotiating
tool to improve working conditions in the South but only if the
workers are aware of codes and are involved in the process.
Appendix II
Women Working Worldwide , Jessica Mock
Who is Women Working Worldwide?
WWW is a very small organisation based in Manchester which works
with women workers groups, mainly in Asia but also in Central
America and the UK. WWW was founded 15 years ago and began out
of a concern for women workers in export production, and the lack
of awareness in Europe.
Women Working Worldwide aims to facilitate information
exchange, raise awareness in Europe of how products are made and
to use this awareness to campaign for the rights of women workers.
This work also includes putting pressure on companies.
Why we are doing work on Codes
Campaigning in North America and Europe has made consumers more
aware of workers conditions and they reacted by putting pressure
on companies as a result companies in these countries are adopting
codes of conduct for their supply chains. The problem is that
companies adopting codes is not enough as this could just be a
public relations exercise. There is a need to ensure that codes
are implemented and this has led to thinking around monitoring
and finally the ETI.
The Ethical Trading Initiative has been set up by
a group of NGOs, trade unions and companies in order to properly
implement codes.
However, as yet workers know very little about codes
or how they could be used to improve their conditions. They also
need to be involved in monitoring codes. What workers think should
be fed into the ETI to influence them. This is why WWW initiated
the codes of conduct project.
How we see codes in a wider context
Women Working Worldwide does not necessarily see codes of conduct
as the answer to workers problems. There are many issues we need
to think about. For example we are looking at the relationship
between codes and trade union activity and between codes and governmental
legislation.
Appendix III
George Tarvit, OXFAM UK
Ethical Trading Initiative
OXFAM is an NGO which supports a variety of projects
aimed at improving living conditions in poor countries. OXFAM
has a special interest in co-operating in activities in support
of the promotion of labour rights in the Central American maquilas.
It is part of the ETI.
The ETI was set up in 1996 as a result of campaigns
organised by various British NGOs on the theme of human rights
and codes of conduct. These campaigns put pressure on major retailers
and British brands to take greater responsibility for the working
conditions throughout their production chain, developing codes
of conduct based on norms established by the ILO, and through
independent monitoring, ensuring that these codes are implemented.
These campaigns succeeded in getting codes of conduct on the negotiating
agenda and persuade various companies to commit themselves to
addressing these themes.
In May 1997 one of Britains most important supermarket
chains, J. Sainsbury suggested and supported joint meetings between
NGOs and other companies interested in codes of conduct. Since
these meetings it has been concluded that there is a need for
these codes and their monitoring. Thus the Ethical Trading Initiative
was established. Trade unions became involved in the project later
that same year. DFID agreed to finance part of this initiative
for a period of three years. Companies are meeting the remainder
of the budget and NGOs involved. The ETI was officially launched
in December 1997 and began its work in January 1998.
In its first year, most of the ETI's work has concentrated
on agreeing the membership criteria and, to this end, has created
its own codes and principles. These criteria were approved in
November 1998. At the same time the ETI has begun to develop pilot
projects and seminars, including Southern consultation exercises.
One of these took place in September 1998 with the participation
of several Central American organisations including MEC.
Objectives of the ETI:
The ETI is an alliance of companies, NGOs and union organisations
committed to working together to identify and promote good practice
in the implementation of the codes in the workplace, including
monitoring and independent verification of compliance with the
measures contained within these codes.
The ETI endeavours to understand the best way of
putting the codes into practice and improve working conditions,
trying out and evaluating the different ways of monitoring a particular
code. The ETI is neither a certification nor a social audit. Rather,
it is interested in identifying the main problems of monitoring
the codes and in promoting effective solutions for different industries
in different parts of the world.
The ETI programme: Pilot projects:
The first three projects have centred on clothing
factories in China, horticulture in Zimbabwe and wine production
in South Africa. Each of these projects includes four or five
companies and involves the suppliers, unions and local NGOs. In
China the focus was on different types of monitoring the project
in each company, (NGOs and unions, people from the academic world,
internal monitoring, SA8000). The wine production project centred
on the suppliers, local NGOs and unions to develop a viable monitoring
system and plans for corrective action. Each pilot project also
involves advisors who evaluate the social impact of the work being
carried out.
The different projects will report their findings
to the ETI members and to other relevant parties outside the ETI
itself, in mid 1999. The results will be the focus of discussions
during the next ETI conference.
Appendix IV
Strategic problems with certification in the light
of the "Social Responsibility 8000 (SA 8000) standard
Ronald Kopke: Professor of Sociology at Bielefeld University of
Applied Sciences, Germany -Co-ordinator of research into codes
of conduct and monitoring in Central America.
SA 8000 was put forward by CEPAA (Council of Economic
Priorities Accreditation Agency). This is a profit making organisation
registered in the USA.
On 15 October 1997 CEPAA announced a "Global
Standard for Auditing and Certification" for all branches
of industry and service sectors in every country of the world
(except agricultural and housework which are excluded).
SA 8000 is based on a number of social responsibility
norms, ie, a code of priority rights. It refers to ILO conventions,
the UN Convention on Child Labour and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Unlike other codes this one refers to salaries that
should cover basic needs and not only a minimum salary. It also
enshrines the right to free association and collective bargaining.
The objective of SA8000 is to find a measurable
uniform standard or norm, that can by verified. A clear and comprehensible
definition would, without doubt, solve the problem of the tangle
of existing codes. It is a positive initiative, however, there
are still concerns about the SA 8000:
The CEPAA accredits organisations that can carry
out audits within the terms of SA 8000. In theory they could be
NGOs but in practice they are large private auditing companies.
There are twenty-six members on the SA 8000 council. Of those
twenty-six most are profit making businesses.
Transnationals have to contract members accredited
by SA 8000 to do their audits. Thus they have the power to define
who will or will not be responsible for such a job. Some organisations
such as the Asian Monitor Research Center have called this the
privatisation of labour rights.
In theory NGOs or trade unions can play the role
of providers of information or as intermediaries between the suppliers
and the certificators. But this model is still deficient from
the Southern workers' point of view. I would like show you the
example of a German transnational.:
We are talking about the Spiegel Corporation Consortium.
It is an import company in the Americas and belongs to Otto and
Eddie Bauer. Currently all Spiegel shares are owned by Otto of
Germany. It is the sixth largest transnational company in the
world of clothing manufacture. Today Eddie Bauer and Otto is just
one empire in the hands of Germans.
After the scandal of the Mandarin maquila in El
Salvador in 1995, negotiations took place between the Clean Clothes
Campaign in Germany and Otto, since Eddie Bauer was involved in
production in Mandarin. However, last year Otto said quite clearly
that it was in a pilot phase of SA 8000 and did not see the need
for signing any agreements with the Clean Clothes Campaign or
making commitments to any other organisation. The investigations
were done and to this day nothing is known about the form the
audit took or how many interviews were conducted in the factories
studied.
The problem is that the auditing team from the certifying
company decides how many factories to visit and how many interviews
to do. The whole process from the beginning to the final certification
remains in their hands. The Asian Monitor Research Center says
that the auditing staff qualified in the methods and terms of
the CEPAA is not sufficiently trained to detect labour rights
abuses. This was a finding made by the Center in interviews with
participants in CEPAA training workshops.
The SA 8000 council would like to involve agencies
such as Trans Fair, which is one of the most famous ethical trading
companies in Germany, set up by the Ebert Foundation of the Social
Democratic Party. Also the representatives from the big trade
union confederations in the Clean Clothes Campaign are coming
closer and closer to the idea of product certification in line
with SA 8000.
Probably, the key motive for some European unions
is that it is much more convenient for them to have an institutionalised
certification than an open monitoring process in which NGOs participate
and where the trade unions' role would need to be redefined within
an open discussion process. In this way the certification would
remain exclusively in the hands of "professionals",
while the work within the companies would remain exclusively trade
union terrain.
Enormous problems exist with the huge amount of
certifications still outstanding relating to the 131 countries
which are producing for the USA market alone. The certifying companies
have a capacity a thousand times greater than our NGOs.
We have no illusions about the capacity of Southern
NGOs given the inequality of economic power. But I still think
the actors in the South could play an important role in the certification
process, especially in the areas where they are strongest. In
the case of MEC it is clear where their strength lies - it is
the link between all the factories in the country, and the women
workers themselves that make up the Movement. A recently published
report on the Las Mercedes free trade zone in Nicaragua is clear
proof of the strength of an NGO like MEC.
There are various suggestions as to the role of
Southern actors. Some of these points are a result of discussions
between women in MEC and Nicaraguan trade unionists:
1. The process of certification of the codes of
conduct is too complicated and in some cases lacks transparency.
Therefore it should be demanded that transnational companies in
the process of certification or in a pilot phase of a social audit,
and indeed any organisation which is proposing to have codes of
conduct, informs the public of the results and the terms of certification.
2. We would like to underline the fact that national legislation
is fundamentally good but there needs to be a big improvement
in its application and monitoring by labour ministries.
3. Any initiative on codes of conduct, which takes place in Central
America, should take into account power relationships and the
real certification processes which are already under way.
4. Gender has not been sufficiently taken into account in terms
of compiling with codes of conduct.
5.A clearer definition is needed of the role of Southern NGOs
and trade unions in this process.
Appendix V
The Salvadoran experience of independent monitoring
Carolina Quinteros, Former member of the Independent Monitoring
Group of El Salvador and currently a masters student at the University
of Costa Rica.
In 1995 there was severe labour unrest in the Mandarin
International factory in El Salvador. The recently formed Mandarin
International Workers Company Union (SETMI), (set up after frustrated
attempts in previous years) led these protests. In this context
the company began to fire people and pressure everyone to denounce
their colleagues, until all the trade unionists had lost their
jobs. About three hundred people were sacked.
After the mass exodus from the factory, the Mandarin
situation made the headlines in the national press and caught
the attention of international media. This led to solidarity campaigns
and denouncements, both inside and outside the country. These
campaigns were directed at Mandarin International as principal
supplier and at Gap Inc. Mandarin and Gap had become an international
concern. Eventually, after a lot of pressure, Gap and Mandarin
conceded to negotiations.
After several months of negotiation, 22 May 1996
finally saw the signing of an agreement, unique at that time in
El Salvador. The management of the Mandarin International factory,
representatives of the recently formed ATEMISA (Mandarin International
Workers Association), representatives from SETMI and the recently
formed Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador, agreed to
put an end to over a year of intense labour conflict through compliance
with the following three points:
1. Re-instatement of the members of the SETMI leadership
2. Re-instatement of those who had left Mandarin during the conflict
which began in 1995 and first three months of 1996
3. Establishment of independent monitoring in the factory, with
the objective of ensuring that both the national law and Gap's
code of conduct are complied with.
GMIES (the Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador)
were responsible for monitoring in the factory. This group the
UCA's Human Rights Institute (IDHUCA), Centre for labour Studies
(CENTRA), the Legal Office of the Archbishop of San Salvador.
To date the factory is reported to have complied
with the accords. The union leadership was able to return to Mandarin
and later achieved the reinstatement of seventy-five people who
left in 1995. SETMI managed to reactivate the union, which had
fallen by the wayside. The factory experienced a notable increase
in its output, employed more staff, and there has been no complaints
of non-compliance with either national law or Gap's code of conduct.
According to a questionnaire completed by the women working in
the factory, about 85% think that conditions in Mandarin are better
than in other maquilas, and the rest, 15% think they are the same.
There were no cases saying that the situation was worse.
So far no violations have been found in Mandarin
either of national law or Gap's code of conduct. In terms of the
ages of the staff who are employed, payment of the minimum salary,
length of the working day, enrolment of social security and treatment
of the workers. The women report that they receive the salary
laid down by the law, overtime is not obligatory, access to toilets
is unrestricted, permission to consult Social Security is not
denied and they state that they are well treated by the supervisors
and management. In addition, Mandarin offers some benefits to
its workers. There is a clinic on the premises, it has a shop
and they offer personal loans to their employees through a fund
established specifically for that purpose.
Among other important agreements that have been
reached with the company Mandarin no longer demands the results
of pregnancy tests from women who join the company and there are
regulations to ensure that people are not sacked for union activity.
What is independent monitoring?
Independent monitoring is an endeavour by civil
society in producer countries to ensure respect for human rights,
national laws and codes of conduct in the contracted company.
Through this process, as well as mere observation, it is an attempt
to facilitate communication, prevent conflict and work together
to find alternative solutions when problems do arise.
Monitoring bodies must be truly independent from
companies undergoing monitoring, respect all the actors involved
and have credibility at nationally and internationally. The formation
of the monitoring group should reflect the strength, respect,
the representation and path of development which has developed
in civil society in the field of labour and human rights.
It is not necessary for the monitoring body to be
expert in every type of problem which may arise. If in a given
moment technical skills are required which the monitoring group
does not have they can seek advice from professionals in that
area.
Given its fundamentally preventative character,
the monitoring group is not limited to receiving complaints from
staff. One of the objectives is to become familiar with the company
beforehand and see to what extent the management comply with labour
law and the code of conduct. Appropriate recommendations can then
be made before a problem has time to develop.
Monitors should have the authority to collect information
in various ways including both announced and unannounced visits
to the factory to observe working conditions. Similarly, they
should also have access to company documents relating to personnel
management, and be able to carry out interviews with the workers
and management. When necessary, meetings should be held outside
the factory premises. Other activities could include opinion polls,
bilateral meetings, and meetings bringing together the management
and the workers' organisations.
It is important to note that independent monitoring
should never be a substitute for the role corresponding to; contracting
company or sub contracting company; the workers; trade unions;
ministry of labour ;or local authorities in the host country.
Neither does it have the power of decision over any action that
interested parties may decide to take, and at all times there
must be respect for the autonomy of such parties.
Independent monitoring cannot become the personnel
management for either the contracting or sub contracting company.
Neither can it, be called on in all conflict situations in the
company, organise a trade union, or replace the government inspection
department.
The role of a monitor is to "actively"
keep watch. Although this goes beyond mere observation in terms
of seeking to prevent conflicts, make necessary recommendations,
facilitate communication between the different parties and draft
relevant reports, it does not have the facility to decide actions
to be taken by others.
Eventually, one of the parties may decide not to
comply with the recommendations and act against the law, act against
the code of conduct or against the progress of the monitoring
process. It is then the monitor's responsibilities to report what
this to the appropriate body. They would also report the incident
to all relevant parties. Then if there is no response, they can
pursue other avenues, that could include approaching organisations
that can mobilize consumer pressure.
On the other hand the monitoring group's work is
limited within the boundaries of what is contained within the
code of conduct and national law. The improvement of working conditions
beyond legal provisions is subject to negotiation between the
workers, trade union and management of the factory. Monitors can
play a mediation role if requested by the parties concerned.
The contribution this type of monitoring makes is
that it offers alternative mechanisms to help ensure respect for
labour rights contained in codes of conduct and national legislation.
The outcome of events at Mandarin leads us to believe that, even
with its limitations, this type of activity can bear fruit.'
Appendix VI
What should and shouldn't be in Codes of Conduct
Lynda Yanz, Coordinator of Maquila Solidarity Network, Canada
There is general agreement, at least among labour
rights activists, if not among companies, on the importance of
voluntary codes containing provisions based on core labour rights
as defined in various ILO conventions concerning freedom of association
and the right to bargain collectively; forced and bonded labour,
child labour; and non-discrimination. There is also general agreement
on the need to include additional provisions that go beyond what
is currently defined as core rights on issues such as health and
safety, hours of work, and wages and other forms of compensation,
although there is some disagreement on how minimum wage standards
should be applied in relation to the right to bargain collectively.
The ICFTU Basic Code of Labour Practice and a number
of European codes also contain a provision on security of employment,
which prohibits the avoidance of labour and social security obligations
through labour-only contracting arrangements or apprenticeship
schemes "where there is not real intent to impart skills
or provide regular employment."
Very few codes contain provisions addressing the
rights of home-based workers. One important exception is the Australian
Code of Practice for Homeworkers, which specifically addresses
the situation of homeworkers in that country. In our view, the
involvement of homeworkers' organizations and their advocates
in debates around codes and monitoring is crucial.
One of the more contentious issues concerning what
should or shouldn't be included in codes of conduct is the issue
of a "living wage." In the US, labour and religious
organizations that were formerly members of the Apparel Industry
Partnership (AIP) withdrew from the partnership at least partially
over the lack of provisions for a living wage in the AIP Fair
Labor Accord. They insist that if codes are to be credible, they
must include provisions for a living wage.
In Canada, those of us involved the campaign for
a federal task force on sweatshop practices have been ambivalent
about the living wage issue. While we recognise the centrality
of the wage issue in the fight to eliminate sweatshop abuses,
and generally favour the inclusion of a living wage provision
in codes of conduct, we are uncomfortable with the idea of Northern
governmental or private sector institutions being granted the
power to define what is a living wage for Southern workers. We
are even more uncomfortable with the fact that Southern labour
and non-governmental organisations have not been particularly
involved in this debate. We are also concerned that the living
wage and how and by whom it is defined could reinforce the fears
of some Southern groups that codes of conduct are at best paternalistic
and at worst protectionist.
Another key issue currently under debate is how
codes of conduct might protect the right of workers to organise
and bargain collectively in countries where those rights are systematically
denied or repressed.
The bigger question is whether codes of conduct
can help create space for workers to exercise their right to organise
and bargain collectively. While there is always the danger that
companies will use codes of conduct to justify investment in countries
with repressive regimes, repressive governments might be less
likely to suppress nascent forms of democratic unionism if a sufficient
number of major companies in a particular sector have adopted
codes of conduct with the same or similar provisions requiring
suppliers to facilitate or at least tolerate worker self- organisation.
In countries where the right to organise is enshrined
in law, yet denied in practice, the issue becomes even more complicated.
How would a "professional" social auditor evaluate whether
the workers' right to organise is being respected in a maquiladora
factory in Tijuana, Mexico, in which the workers are formally
represented by an "official union" and a "protection
contract" has been signed, but the workers had no say in
choosing the union or negotiating the contract?
On the other hand, could the workers in Tijuana,
in collaboration with US and Canadian allies, use the code complaints
procedure to challenge whether their right to freedom of association
is being respected, much as groups have used the NAFTA side agreements
to challenge the Mexican government's failure to enforce its labour
and environmental legislation?
Monitoring
There is general agreement among labour rights advocates and even
some consumer products companies that internal monitoring (by
company staff) of supplier compliance with codes of conduct is
not adequate, and that some form of third-party external monitoring
or verification is necessary for codes to have any legitimacy.
There is a great deal of disagreement, however, about who are
appropriate external or independent monitors or social auditors,
and what their relationship should be with the companies whose
suppliers' practices are being monitored.
While there are a few examples of local, independent
human rights, women's and religious organisations being mandated
by Northern apparel companies to carry out on-going monitoring
of particular supplier factories, the more recent trend is for
companies to contract "independent" organisations, individuals
or private sector auditing firms to carry out verification audits
of one or more supplier factories on a periodic basis.
While many labour rights advocates are opposed to
private sector involvement in monitoring of codes of conduct,
some labour leaders, such as Neil Kearney, are generally supportive
of the SA8000 model and feel that the proper role for NGOs and
unions is to consult with the professional social auditors and
be prepared to challenge unjustified certifications, rather than
to engage directly in monitoring.
While we and other labour rights advocacy groups
would acknowledge that in most countries Southern human rights,
women's and religious groups do not currently have the capacity
to monitor or audit the thousands of supplier factories producing
for Northern apparel companies, we are increasingly uncomfortable
with the emerging model in which large private sector social auditing
firms with little or no human rights experience or commitment
to workers' rights are becoming the primary judges of whether
codes of conduct are being adhered to.
We question whether Northern private sector auditors,
even those with proper training, will have sufficient trust of
Southern workers to receive their full story. Northern professionals
hired by multinational consumer products companies will inevitably
be seen as company representatives. While private sector auditors
may be able to adequately evaluate supplier compliance with measurable
standards, such as air quality, we are skeptical about their ability
to judge violations of workers' right to organise or other less
objectively measurable standards. At the very least, local NGOs
must be given a more active role in monitoring and/or verification
than merely being placed on the list of local groups to be consulted.
One option is to create NGO consortia of Northern
and Southern labour rights advocacy groups and health and safety
experts, and then seek accreditation under SA8000 and/or the AIP.
However, the opposition of US labour and religious groups to the
AIP Accord would make participation in this initiative problematic.
A second option is to demand changes in one or both of those initiatives
to give a greater role to Southern NGOs and labour groups in code
verification. A third option is to plan for strategic challenges
of particular certifications of supplier factories in countries
where worker organising is a real possibility. These three options
are not mutually exclusive, and different strategies could be
pursued by different organisations.
Whichever strategy or strategies NGOs and labour
groups adopt in relation to global monitoring, verification and
certification systems, there must be more attention given to training
and capacity building for Southern groups either currently involved
or wishing to become involved in factory monitoring and/or verification.
Access to Information
A major question in the negotiation of codes is how much information
and to whom companies should be required to disclose, such as
the names and locations of supplier factories and workshops, the
identity of workplaces that have been audited and the results
of those audits, and the results of investigations into worker
or third-party complaints. Closely associated with this issue
is the question of what mechanisms and procedures are
necessary to allow workers and "interested parties"
to challenge supplier certifications and accreditation's of auditors.
Codes and Labour Legislation
A major issue for labour rights advocates in both the North and
the South is how voluntary codes and monitoring and verification
systems impact on local labour legislation and its enforcement.
This is not only an issue for Southern groups. Some groups in
Canada have also been reluctant to consider the use of a voluntary
code of conduct as a tool to address domestic labour rights violations,
fearing that voluntary initiatives might play into
government and corporate privatisation and deregulation agendas.
Even Central American NGOs that are currently involved in independent
monitoring projects have expressed concerns that independent monitoring
should not be seen as a substitute for government regulation.
Despite these concerns, we believe that voluntary
codes and monitoring systems can potentially be used to reinforce
existing legislation and encourage governments to enforce that
legislation. Most recently-developed multi-company, industry-wide
or multi-sector codes contain provisions requiring companies to
ensure that their suppliers adhere to local labour and other appropriate
legislation, as well as other provisions of the code,
and that the higher standard should prevail.
Codes, Monitoring and Union Organising
In Central America, independent monitoring initiatives linked
to Northern codes of conduct have exacerbated already existing
tensions between unions, women's groups and NGOs. Many Central
American unions are suspicious of voluntary codes of conduct and
monitoring schemes, seeing them as undermining the legitimate
role of unions. This tension has been most pronounced in cases
in which local NGOs are involved in long-term monitoring of a
factory in which one or more unions is attempting to organise.
On the other hand, the survival of unions in some of these same
factories can be attributed, at least in part, to the existence
of independent monitoring.
With the advent of multi-company, industry-wide
and cross-sector codes and global monitoring and verification
systems, the relationship between union organising, monitoring
and social auditing will undoubtedly become an even more contentious
issue. On the one hand, codes, monitoring, social auditing and
factory certification systems could increase the democratic space
for workers to organise and provide an additional channel (in
addition to state mechanisms) to challenge company violations
of the right to organise. On the other hand, social auditing and
third party complaints procedures could offer companies a paternalistic
alternative to worker self-organisation.
Whether codes and global auditing and certification
systems strengthen or weaken worker organising depends a great
deal on how unions and NGOs intervene in these processes. If legitimate
local NGOs are mandated to play an active role in monitoring,
verification or worker rights training, they will gain greater
access to workers and to their workplaces. However, if these NGOs
decide to participate in the monitoring or verification processes,
they will also need to retain sufficient autonomy to challenge
unjust factory certifications, as well as violations of the law.
If Northern and Southern labour and non-government
organisations are able to co-ordinate and collaborate on third
party challenges of factory certifications, where the right to
organise is being violated, and/or challenges of accreditation
of the auditing firm involved, such actions could help create
the space for union organising to be successful.
